

SIL Assessment – Quick Reference

BS EN (/IEC) 61508 Parts 1-7 "Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems" – applies to new SIL (Safety Integrity level) rated instruments, controllers & valves. Generic safety standard stating 'lifecycle' requirements and guidelines.

BS EN (/IEC) 61511 Parts 1-3 "Functional safety – Safety instrumented systems (SIS) for the process industry sector". All Buncefield-type sites should have had overfill prevention systems assessed & comply with this standard, to the HSE's satisfaction, by the end of 2007.

IEC 61511 is for the process industry, IEC 61513 is for the nuclear industry & IEC 62061 is for the machinery sector. **SRS** in IEC 61508 means **Safety Related System**; SRS in IEC 61511 means **Software Requirement Specification**.


EUC = Equipment Under Control

£1M typical VPF (Value of Preventative Fatality)

Maximum tolerable risk levels:

INDIVIDUAL RISK per annum			
Consequence	Minor/ Serious	Serious/ Fatal	Multi-fatal
Employee	10 ⁻³	10 ⁻⁴	10 ⁻⁵
Public	10 ⁻⁴	10 ⁻⁵	10 ⁻⁶

BROADLY ACCEPTABLE RISK (Negligible)			
Consequence	Minor/ Serious	Serious/ Fatal	Multi-fatal
Employee and Public	10 ⁻⁵	10 ⁻⁶	10 ⁻⁶



PFD = Probability of Failure on Demand

LOPA = Layer of Protection Analysis IPL = Independent Protection Layers RRF = Risk Reduction Factor

SRS required PFD = $\underbrace{\text{Max tolerable risk [pa]}}_{\text{Event likelihood }}$ [pa]

Event likelihood (without SRS) [pa] = Initiating likelihood [pa] x PFD (control system) x PFD (alarms) x PFD (mechanical protection)

SIL Table - LOW DEMAND mode of operation

SIL	PFD (probability, unitless)	
4	≥10 ⁻⁵ to <10 ⁻⁴	
3	≥10 ⁻⁴ to <10 ⁻³	
2	≥10 ⁻³ to <10 ⁻²	
1	≥10 ⁻² to <10 ⁻¹	

SIL Table - **HIGH DEMAND or CONTINUOUS**

mode of operation

mode of operation		
SIL	λ_D per hour	~λ _D per year
4	≥10 ⁻⁹ to <10 ⁻³	≥10 ⁻⁵ to <10 ⁻⁴
3	≥10 ⁻⁸ to <10 ⁻⁷	≥10 ⁻⁴ to <10 ⁻³
2	≥10 ⁻⁷ to <10 ⁻⁵	≥10 ⁻³ to <10 ⁻²
1	≥10 ⁻⁶ to <10 ⁻⁵	≥10 ⁻² to <10 ⁻¹

 λ_{S} = failure rate, safe

 λ_{DD} = failure rate, dangerous detected λ_{DH} = failure rate, dangerous undetected

SFF = Safe Failure Fraction

SFF = $(\lambda_S + \lambda_{DD}) / (\lambda_S + \lambda_{DD} + \lambda_{DU})$

Type A Sub System – e.g. valve or simple instrument: Failure modes are well defined, failure behaviour is determined, and there is dependable failure data. Type B Sub System – e.g. programmable controller or instrument.

Type A Fault Tolerance table

SFF	0 (single)	1 (1002)	2 (1003
011	o (onigio)	1 (1002)	or 3004)
< 60%	SIL1	SIL2	SIL3
60% - < 90%	SIL2	SIL3	SIL4
90% - <99%	SIL3	SIL4	SIL4
≥99%	SIL3	SIL4	SIL4

Type B Fault Tolerance table

SFF	0 (single)	1 (1002)	2 (1003
SFF	o (sirigle)	1 (1002)	or 3004)
< 60%	Not allowed	SIL1	SIL2
60% - < 90%	SIL1	SIL2	SIL3
90% - <99%	SIL2	SIL3	SIL4
≥99%	SIL3	SIL4	SIL4

CCF = Common Cause Failure (typically 5 - 8%)

RBD = Reliability Block Diagram

MTTR = Mean Time To Repair

MDT = Mean Down Time

Tp = Proof Test Interval

Detected failures in simplex (1001) systems: $PFD_{DD} = \lambda_{DD}.MDT = \lambda_{DD}.MTTR$

Undetected failures in simplex systems: $PFD_{DIJ} = \lambda_{DIJ} \cdot Tp/2$

Simplex SIS/SRS: PFD = \sum PFD_{DD} + \sum PFD_{DU}

Failure rate per hour x downtime in hours = dimensionless PFD

Failure rate per hour x 8760 hours/year = failure rate/year (useful for LOPA initiating likelihood)